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COURT OF APPEALS, 1960 TERM
plaintiff, i.e., a plan which was acceptable, would provide the consideration for
the contract.
By imposing on the defendants an implied promise to obtain insurance from
the plaintiff, if his plans were acceptable, from the initial request of the
defendants, the dissent did what the majority had refused to do. This implied
obligation, once established, enabled the dissent to acquire vast legal support
for its decision. 5 The majority, unlike the dissent, was not willing to imply a
promise to pay the plaintiff for his services, since the negotiations between the
parties had not passed the informal stage. To imply a promise to pay on the
basis of informal conversations between friends would, according to the
majority, create a new and undesirable type of contract liability.
In Blanshan v. Russell,6 the only case cited by the majority in the case at
bar, it was held that services rendered by a woman to a man to whom she was
engaged to be married, without any idea of being paid therefor, are no
consideration for subsequent assurances by defendant that plaintiff would be
paid. In the instant case, one can be reasonably certain that an insurance agent,
whose livelihood is dependent upon his commissions from the sale of insurance,
would expect compensation for his services if his plans were acceptable. The
Blanshan case can be distinguished from the instant case because there was
probably no intent by the insurance agent to offer his services gratuitously, and
the dissent was undoubtedly correct in implying a promise from the initial
request for an insurance plan.
L. H. S.
OFFICER NOT PERSONALLY LIABLE ON CORPORATE CONTRACT NOTWITHSTAND-
ING CLAUSE TO THE CONTRARY
In Salzman Sign Co. v. Beck,7 the plaintiff contracted with the Leslie 575
Corporation, of which defendant's intestate was president, for the purchase of
an advertising sign. Paragraph five of the printed-form contract stipulated that
where the purchaser was a corporation, the officer signing on behalf of the
corporation "hereby personally guarantee [s] the payments hereinabove provided
for." The signature for the purchasing corporation appeared thusly: "Leslie
575 Corp. L.S.[,] Irving Beck pres L.S.." Plaintiff sued defendant- for the
balance due on the contract.
The trial court held for the defendant on the ground that there was no
clear indication that Beck intended to be bound personally. The Appellate
Term affirmed, granting the defendant summary judgment and dismissing the
complaint. The Appellate Division, in affirming,8 granted leave to appeal to
the Court of Appeals, which in affirmance held that the contract executed and
5. See Hedemann v. Fairbanks, Morse & Co., 286 N.Y. 240, 36 N.E.2d 129 (1941);
Rubin v. Dairymen's League Co-op. Ass'n, 284 N.Y. 32, 29 N.E.2d 458 (1941); Willetts v.
The Sun Mutual Ins. Co., 45 N.Y. 45 (1871).
6. Blansban v. Russell, supra note 3.
7. 10 N.Y.2d 63, 217 N.Y.S.2d 55 (1961).
8. 11 A.D.2d 1068, 206 N.Y.S.2d 525 (2d Dep't 1961).
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signed by the individual as president was not sufficient for Statute of Frauds
purposes to bind the officer individually in the absence of "direct and explicit
evidence of actual intent," even though a paragraph in the contract stated that
the signing officer guaranteed payments on the contract price.
On its face the decision appears to be an affirmance by the Court of
Warren-Connolly Co. v. Saphin,9 an earlier case decided by the Appellate
Division. In this almost identical case, the court treated a similar guarantee
paragraph within the Statute of Frauds,1 and the contract was rendered
unenforceable against the signing corporate representative as an individual
because he did not sign as an individual. The court felt that a contrary holding
would thwart the purposes of the Statute of Frauds.
In the present case, however, the Court of Appeals did not rely on the
Warren-Connolly case. It would seem that the Court relegated that decision to
a stature of little significance and confused matters by considering a previous
Court of Appeals case, Mencher v. Weiss," from which it borrowed the term,
"direct and explicit evidence," which if shown would seemingly be used to hold
the corporate representative personally liable on the contract. In the Mencher
case, the Court, in interpreting the language of the contract, had to determine
whether the addition of the word "member" to the corporate signature was
enough to bind the representatives as individuals in view of a statement in the
collective bargaining agreement which purported to bind individual members of
the corporate party. The Statute of Frauds was irrelevant there.
The result reached in the instant case, nevertheless, is the same fair
judgment the Appellate Division rendered in the Warren-Connolly case. Note-
worthy also is the fact that in the present case there was probably no fair
negotiation of the guarantee paragraph; at least, the wording of the paragraph
and the fact that the contract was a standard printed-form contract lead to that
belief; so, for public policy reasons, that stipulation could have been rendered
ineffective against the defendant here. Obviously, too, there would be un-
dreamed of liability on the part of the corporate officer signing on behalf of his
corporation were courts to give effect to a rather "obscure" single sentence in a
long contract, even though it may be plausibly argued that the signing party
is presumed to have read the entire contract and thus bound by all its terms.
One problem, however, yet remains. It is not quite clear what, short of a
second signature as an individual, would meet the requirement of some "direct
and explicit evidence of actual intent" to satisfy the Statute of Frauds.
E.J.S.
9. 283 App. Div. 391, 128 N.Y.S.2d 272 (1st Dep't 1952).
10. N.Y. Pers. Prop. Law § 31 (2). (The guarantee of the debt of another must be in
writing signed by the person to be bound.)
11. 306 N.Y. 1, 114 N.E.2d 177 (1953).
